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Abstract—The August 2003 Blackout event showed that the
PowerGrid is vulnerable to the cyber attacks. The event also
showed the need for automatic detection of abnormal behaviors
in the PowerGrid. In this paper, we propose a solution for
the problem of detecting anomaly behaviors such as reporting
incorrect status of the devices of the PowerGrid. First, we
apply the non-parametric Cumulative Sum algorithm for quickest
detection of the value-changing problem. Then, to improve the
speed of detection, we explore the use of two data aggregation
schemes: average-aggregation and quantize-aggregation. Our
analytical and simulation results show that end-to-end detection
delay should include not only the semantic computation of the
data but also the underlying communication networks. Finally,
we show that it is possible to improve the end-to-end detection
delay by data aggregation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The August 2003 Blackout event made us all aware of the
great vulnerabilities in the current PowerGrid [1]. Although
the blackout started at one substation, where overloads on lines
were mistaken for faults by the local automated controls, the
major issue was the malfunctioning software. The erroneous
software prevented the system from properly reporting the sta-
tus data to the operators which led to inappropriate decisions
and ultimating to the major blackout event.
Although the event has been an accident, it is of serious
concern that if this event were an attack, as it shows serious
failures in security and if not repaired, it could happen again
in the future. The event clearly shows that the PowerGrid is
vulnerable to cyber attacks since it is indistinguishable if the
software is malfunctioning or infected by malicious viruses.
Actually, FirstEnergy company in Ohio reported that one of
the nuclear power plants was infected by Slammer virus in
January 2003. F-Secure company also warned that the Blaster
virus might cause the sensors to deliver delayed or wrong data
on the status of the grid. All of the cases above show that we
need secure solutions that can detect such malicious behaviors
for the PowerGrid.
There are several existing solutions to protect the PowerGrid
from malicious software behaviors of devices. The simplest
solution is to let relays send a signal to open circuit breakers
if the measurement falls out of the acceptable range. However,
this scheme can only deal with pre-defined local rules. The
measurements can be changed arbitrarily as long as they do
not violate the local rules.
Another solution is to use the SCADA system (Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition) to monitor the devices, display
the historical data on screen and leave the detection task to
the operators [2]. This solution does not work very well as
shown in the August 2003 blackout event.
Recently, PMUs (Phasor Measurement Units) have been
used for wide area measurements [3][4][5]. Data from devices
in the field can be sent to a control center synchronously
in milliseconds. However, this scheme requires a reference
clock, which may be received from the Global Positioning
System (GPS) of satellites, for clock synchronization and is
an expensive solution because a PMU can cost up to $30, 000.
Also, there are only a few of them in the US. Furthermore,
how to detect the event automatically is not provided in this
approach.
Outside of PowerGrid domain, several areas studied ma-
licious software and detection of erroneous data. Quickest
change detection problems [6][7][8][9] were studied for long
time in the industrial process monitoring area. More recently,
these techniques have been applied to sensor networks, but
without any underlying communication constrains except [10].
Therefore, it is unclear how well they apply to the PowerGrid.
If one takes the communication constraints in sensor net-
works into account, it becomes clear that we need techniques
that reduce the communication overhead and still allow for
erroneous data detection. One of the techniques explored in
sensor networks is data aggregation. However, whether data
aggregation works in the context of PowerGrid, has not been
studied.
In this paper, we explore the two techniques quickest change
detection and data aggregation in the context of PowerGrid.
We will apply these techniques in the SCADA system for
anomaly detection. The proposed anomaly detection process
is adaptive, i.e. it can work under various network conditions.
This process provides an automatic alarm reporting to the
operators, i.e. it automatically and quickly detects abnormal
behaviors of devices and alert operators.
Our anomaly detection process will deploy a hybrid ap-
proach mixing quickest change detection and data aggre-
gation. Specifically, we will apply Cumulative Sum change
detection algorithm as well as two aggregation paradigms:
average-aggregation and quantize-aggregation. Furthermore,
our anomaly detection process will include a rigorous delay
analysis which shows that the end-to-end detection delay
should include not only the semantic computation of the data
but also the underlying communication networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II,
we introduce SCADA, the system that governs sub-stations
of the PowerGrid, which is the main entity of our anomaly
detection process. We present system models and assumptions
in section III. In section IV, we show our framework and
approach. In section V, we introduce the theory of change-
point detection problem and how it can be applied in our
solution. In section VI, we give a detailed analysis of delay
factors to be used in the detection process. We validate the
delay analysis in section VII. Section VIII concludes our paper.
II. SCADA SYSTEMS IN THE POWERGRID
Within a PowerGrid sub-station, the system that controls and
monitors all devices is the SCADA (Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition) whose functions are monitoring, gathering
data and controlling industrial processes.
SCADA systems have been used not only in the PowerGrid
but also in many other critical infrastructures such as Water
Systems, Manufacturing Process and Traffic Lights systems.
A typical SCADA system consists of four main components:
• Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) which measure
and report raw data to Remote Terminal Units;
• Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) which receive data from
IEDs and are responsible for transmitting data to SCADA
master or other RTUs;
• SCADA Masters which receive and process data from
RTUs and trigger alarms if necessary;
• Communication Networks, which can be both wired or
wireless.
SCADA systems have been well developed and thus, we
will not discuss further details here. More details on SCADA
systems can be found in [2][11][4][5].
III. SYSTEM MODELS & ASSUMPTIONS
The notation of the entire paper can be found in Table III
in Appendix.
A. Network Model
As shown in Figure 1, a SCADA network can be modeled
as a hierarchical network where the leaves are represented
by the IEDs, the parents to IEDs are the RTUs, and the
RTUs report their results to the Control Center. The network
connecting IEDs with RTUs may use different technologies
from the network connecting RTUs with the Control Center in
the context of traditional SCADA systems and the IEC 61850
standard.
In traditional SCADA systems, typical underlying networks
connecting IEDs with RTUs have separate communication
links and communicate via serial communication ports (RS-
232/RS-422/RS-485) [2][11]. RTUs also have separate dedi-
cated links to communicate with the Control Center. These
links can be wired (e.g. copper cables, telephone lines) or
wireless (e.g. radio)[2] [11]. However, we will not use this
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type of model in our work. Instead, we will use a general
type of networks similar to the UCA2 [5] standard and the
IEC 61850 [4] standard.
The network connecting IEDs and RTUs is a high-speed
LAN (Local Area Network) type of network, while the net-
work connecting RTU and the Control Center is a WAN (Wide
Area Network). The reason for LAN is that IED devices are
within a sub-station and can be setup to form a LAN, while
the Control Center might be far away from RTUs and can only
be connected through a WAN.
We also assume that the Internet Protocol runs on top of
these networks. In other words, each device will have an IP
address configured manually or automatically (e.g. Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol).
We assume each network (LAN/WAN) will have a realtime
mechanisms to ensure deadline guarantees to RTU/IED mes-
sages. The realtime schemes will have an admission control
component, whose job will be to accept new messages only
when they can be guaranteed to meet their deadlines. Further-
more, we assume a soft real-time scheduling algorithm over
LAN/WAN IP networks to control the message delivery.
B. Data Model
Typically, data reported by IEDs can be voltage or current
measurements. Furthermore, the data can be only within a
range (min,max). If any data falls out of this range, the IEDs
will locally react and alert the Control Center. For example,
if voltage goes above a certain threshold, the IED will send a
signal to open the circuit breaker and alert the Control Center.
Although the data can be modeled as a deterministic vari-
able, we model it as a normal random variable whose mean
is fixed. The reasons are as follows:
• Measurement are subjected to noise error.
• The data is affected by many small effects, which are
usually modeled as a normal random variable. For exam-
ple, the current measurement will vary when any device
is turned on/off, and can be modeled as a normal random
variable.
In the Power Grid, typically IEDs report data deterministi-
cally. Furthermore, they must meet the deadline. For example,
the deadline for reporting data from IEDs to IEDs is 4ms [4].
The deadline for reporting data from RTUs to the Control
Center is 5s-10s, depending on each sub-station.
We model data reporting tasks as aperiodic tasks whose
arrivals follow a Poisson process. The reasons for this general
model are as follows:
• Under an unknown attack, data may not follow a deter-
ministic (periodic) pattern. Therefore, an aperiodic task
model is necessary.
• The Poisson process assumption relaxes the periodic
requirement. On average, the arrival rate is still equal to
that of periodic tasks. Therefore, if one requires periodic
reporting behavior, our model is still valid.
C. Attack/Failure Model
There are two types of attacks/failures that can happen under
our data model. The first type is mean-change attack/failure
where the mean value of data is shifted arbitrarily. However,
we assume that the operators are only interested in attacks
where the mean-shift amount is greater than Dmin.
The other type is the attack on data reporting patterns
(e.g. Denial-of-Service attack) where the data can be delayed
or flooded arbitrarily. Although our framework enables the
detection of both types of attack, we only consider the first
type in this paper.
D. Aggregation Model
As mentioned above, data aggregation is a technique
compacting or converting data to another form for reducing
communication overhead in sensor networks. This technique
can be applied to the PowerGrid due to two reasons:
• Most of data aggregation techniques in sensor networks
work in hierarchical manner. Since the PowerGrid also
has hierarchical network, these techniques can be applied
to the PowerGrid.
• Since the scale of IEDs of the PowerGrid can grow
large (e.g. thousands of IEDs), real-time communica-
tion requirements could be violated. Aggregating data at
the RTUs will significantly reduce the communication
overhead, which makes it easier to meet the real-time
requirements.
Next, we present our aggregation model. Then, we show
the definition of average-aggregation and quantize-aggregation
methods and explain why we use them.
1) Model: An aggregation function g takes a tuple of n
values (x1, x2, ...xn) as inputs, then outputs the aggregated
value y, i.e.
y = g(x1, x2, ...xn)
Given the network is a hierarchical system, the aggregation
can be performed at intermediate nodes. Figure 2 shows an ex-
ample of a hierarchical aggregation where y1 = g(x1, x2, x3),
y2 = g(x4, x5, x6) and y3 = g(x7, x8, x9). y1, y2, y3 will be
sent to the root node for further processing.
2) Average Aggregation: The average aggregation is de-
fined as follows.
g(x1, x2, ...xn) =
x1 + x2 + ...+ xn
n
It is easy to see that hierarchical aggregation for average
aggregation can be done in a straightforward manner. Each
intermediate node calculates the average value of its children
and reports directly to the Control Center.
Fig. 2. Hierarchical Aggregation
As we can see that, there are two reasons why we use
average-aggregation in our solution.
• average() function is simple and can be calculated
quickly without incurring much computation overhead for
RTUs.
• average() function maintains enough information of
abnormal values but it is not too sensitive to those values
asmin() andmax(). Furthermore, if aggregation scheme
uses min() as the aggregation function, then the attacker
could easily find the nodes (by listening) that produce
the min value, and attack those nodes by changing their
values. The average() makes it harder to detect which
nodes have that values and which nodes to attack.
3) Quantize Aggregation: An analog signal (e.g. current
signal) is sampled for digital representation. Each sample
being a real number is quantized and represented as a bit string
for digital processing. The more bits are given to represent the
real sample, the more accurate its digital form is. Our quantize-
aggregation technique compresses further the digital form by
keeping only most significant bits and leaving out the rest.
A b-bits quantize means we take b left-most significant bits
of the value. For example, 2-bits quantize of 1101 is 11.
A b-bits de-quantize means we will recover the original
value by adding 0s to the quantized value. For the above
example, b-bit dequantize process will return 1100.
A b-bits quantize aggregation of a tuple (x1, x2, ...xn) will
take b-bits quantize of each element and merge the bits results
into a single value. For example, 2-bits quantize aggregation
of the tuple (1010, 1101, 0101) will return 101101.
To perform a b-bits hierarchical aggregation, each inter-
mediate node performs b-bits quantize aggregation of its
children and reports the results to the Control Center. Then, the
Control Center can split the value into multiple b-bits quantize
value and perform b-bits de-quantize to get values for further
processing.
The reasons we use quantize-aggregation are as follows.
• Quantize Aggregation is very light-weight in terms of
computation for RTUs.
• Similar to average aggregation, it keeps enough informa-
tion of abnormal values but it is not too sensitive to those
values as min() and max().
• We can control the degree of aggregation by adjusting
the number of allocating bits b.
4) Accuracy of Aggregation: Data aggregation can be con-
sidered as a type of lossy compression. Thus, it is important
to understand factors affecting its accuracy.
Based on the definitions of the two aggregation schemes,
we have following observations.
• For average-aggregation, number of variables n is the
main factor that affects its accuracy. The more variables
are in the set, the less accuracy of the aggregated value
is observed.
• For quantize-aggregation, number of bits b allocated for
aggregation is the main factor affecting its accuracy.
The accuracy of the aggregation plays an important role for
mean-change attack detection and is discussed in section V.
IV. FRAMEWORK
A. Goals
The ultimate goal of our system is monitoring and
detecting anomalies at IEDs as soon as possible, under
communication and false alarm rate constraints.
As mentioned in section III-C, we only consider mean-
change attacks. In the subsequent sections, first we will show
our approach, including the architecture and protocols for the
problem. Then, we will introduce the theory of change-point
detection to see how the problem can be solved theoretically.
Because this theory does not consider any communication
model, we will analyze how it works in our scheme by giving
a detailed end-to-end detection delay analysis.
B. Approach
1) Architecture: Figure 3 shows the proposed architecture.
It includes three components: The semantic (data) aggregator,
topology aggregator and detector.
Data aggregators (DA) are placed at RTUs. They sample
data from IEDs, aggregate and send the result to the Control
Center. DAs are used to detect mean-change attacks.
Topology aggregators (TA) , also residing at RTUs, monitor,
aggregate and store QoS (Quality of Service) information, such
as available bandwidth and delay, about the topology among
IEDs and RTUs. In addition, TAs are also responsible for
clustering IEDs based on QoS metrics and locations. TAs are
used for detection of attacks on the data reporting patterns.
The last component, Detector, placed at the Control Center,
takes information either directly from DAs or TAs, analyzes
and generates alarms to the operators if needed.
In this paper, we will mainly focus on Data Aggregators and
how Detectors detect mean-change attacks. Other components
will be addressed in the future work.
2) Protocols: Figure 4 illustrates how data goes from IEDs
to RTUs and is aggregated and used for detection.
• At IED level: When an IED wants to send a packet, it
follows the realtime scheduling algorithm, which includes
an admission control test and a priority assignment pro-
cedure, to ensure that its packet can meet the deadline
without affecting other IEDs and RTUs.
• At RTU level: An RTU collects, aggregates and sends
data from its IEDS to the Control Center in rounds.
Different RTUs have different rounds. RTUs start a new
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round when the system is booted. An RTU ends the
current round when it receives data from each of its
IEDs in that round1. After aggregating data and sending
aggregated data to the Control Center, the RTU starts a
new round.
Similar to IEDs, RTUs must follow the realtime schedul-
ing algorithm when sending their packets to ensure that
all packets can meet the deadlines without interfering
with other IEDs and RTUs.
• At the Control Center level:
The only task of the Control Center in our scheme is
receiving data from RTUs and performing the mean-
change attack detection algorithm, which is introduced
in the next section.
V. QUICKEST CHANGE-POINT DETECTION PROBLEM
Mean-change attack detection is similar to the quickest
change-point detection problem, whose goal is the quickest
detection of the change-point under a fixed false alarm rate.
While there are various algorithms for this problem, the
Cumulative Sum algorithm (CUSUM), besides its simplicity,
has been shown to have advantages over other detection
methods under small disorder scenarios (see [9], Chapter 4).
This advantage is very well suited for our data model of the
PowerGrid. Therefore, we use the CUSUM algorithm as the
mean-change detection algorithm. It is important to stress that
solutions for quickest change-point detection problem do not
consider any underlying communication. Therefore, all the
terms in this section that express the delay have the same
unit: number of samples.
Before discussing the CUSUM algorithm, we briefly intro-
duce the background of the general change-point detection
1We do not consider the attacks that delay the reporting of data. We also
assume the transmission is reliable.
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problem and the mean-change detection problem.
A. General Change-Point Detection Problem
Let us consider a sequence of observed random variables
X = {x(n)}∞n=1 with conditional density pθ(xk|xk−1, ..., x1).
Before the unknown change time τ , the conditional density
parameter θ is constant and equal to θ0. After the change,
the parameter is equal to θ1. The problem is to detect the
occurrence of change as soon as possible, with a fixed rate of
false alarms before τ .
An online change detection algorithm will define a stopping
rule, which usually has the form
T = inf{n : gn(x1, ..., xn) ≥ h}
where h is a threshold, and (gn)n≥1 is a statistic, calcu-
lated from observations (x1, ...xn). Function g can be a log-
likelihood function or a cumulative function as defined below.
The intuition is that if the result of the statistic function
(e.g. log-likelihood) is greater than a certain threshold h, the
change-point is declared.
Metrics for the change detection algorithm are usually
average detection delay and false alarm rate. Formally, the
average detection delay is defined as
ADDτ (T ) = Eθ1(T − τ |T ≥ τ)
and false alarm rate is
FAR(T ) =
1
Eθ0 [T ]
B. Mean-Change Detection Problem
The above change detection formulation requires the knowl-
edge of the distribution of observed random variables X .
In other words, they are parametric methods. In practice,
especially in our case, it is undesirable to require such knowl-
edge because when an attack occurs, the observed random
variables may not follow any distribution. This necessitates
non-parametric methods.
The non-parametric change detection problem also has
received attention. Due to the lack of distribution of observed
random variables, non-parametric change detection problems
usually look at changes in mean, variance or correlation values.
In our case, we are only interested in mean change. The mean-
change problem can be defined as follows.
Let us consider a sequence of observed random variables
X = {x(n)}∞n=1 such that
x(n) = µ+AnI(n < τ) + (D +Bn)I(n ≥ τ)
where A = {An}∞n=1, B = {Bn}∞n=1 are random sequences
such that E[An] = E[Bn] = 0, D is the change amount of the
mean, τ is the change-point and I(·) is the indication function.
Note that without the loss of generality, we assume D > 0.
Similar to the parametric change detection problem, stop-
ping rule and metrics are defined in the same manner for the
mean-change detection problem. The only difference is the
definition of the statistic function g for quickest detection as
we will show now.
C. Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) Algorithm
1) Parametric version: Page [12] proposed an algorithm
for change detection problem as follows.
Let us define the statistic function g as
gk = (gk−1 + sk)+, g0 = 0
where x+ = max(0, x) and sk = log
pθ1 (xk)
pθ0 (xk)
.
The stopping rule is
T = min{k : gk ≥ h}
where h is the threshold and is normally set to log 1FAR .
The key idea of CUSUM algorithm is to exploit the nature
of the log-likelihood ratio sk, which is negative before the
change and positive after the change. CUSUM cumulates
the positive part and declares a change when the cumulation
exceeds the threshold h. The negative is out of interest and is
set to zero.
2) Non-parametric version: The statistic function defined
above obviously requires the form of distribution. A non-
parametric version was proposed in [9][8]. The statistic func-
tion is now defined as
gk = (gk−1 + sk)+, g0 = 0
and
sk = xk − µ0 − E[µ1|xk, ..., x0]
where µ0 is the mean before change and is supposed to be
known, µ1 is the unknown mean after change,  is the sensitive
factor.
The key idea for the non-parametric version is to replace
the log-likelihood ratio sk in the parametric version with
another term that shows the difference between the mean
before change µ0 and the mean after change µ1. Because the
mean µ1 is not known, we need to predict it based on historical
data (x0, ...xk). The estimator can be an average or a simple
linear estimator. However, we want an estimator that can forget
the observations that are far in the past. Therefore, we use
an adaptive exponentially weighted estimator. This estimator
predicts based on sequential inputs as follows.
Let θˆ be the current prediction of the mean µ1. If sn = 0,
we just set θˆn = µ0 because there is no change occurring. If
sn > 0,
θˆn =
1
βn−1 + 1
(βn−1θˆn−1 + xn) (1)
where the weight is βn = 1 + βn−1 and is reset to zero
when sn = 0. This weight is similar to the weight of the
exponential moving average2. The only difference is that it
depends on historical observations.
In this paper, due to the effectiveness and simplicity of non-
parametric CUSUM algorithm, we will use it to provide the
quickest mean-change detection. The following property of
CUSUM will be used for our analysis in the next section.
2The moving average has the form θˆn = αxn+(1−α)θˆn−1. α is similar
to 1
βn−1+1
as in (1)
Lemma 1: Asymptotically, the non-parametric version of
CUSUM for mean-change detection problem has the average
detection delay
ADDτ (T ) =
h
(1− )µ1 − µ0 , h→∞.
Proof: See [8].
Note that the unit of the delay is number of samples of
observed variables.
3) Non-parametric CUSUM algorithm under data
aggregation: Let us consider a system which has an RTU r
and ne IEDs reporting to RTU r. Let us assume that there is
an attack at IED e. We have following lemmas.
Lemma 2: Let ADD∗ be the asymptotic delay to detect the
attack without any aggregation. It will take neADD∗ samples
for average-aggregation to detect the attack.
Proof: Omitted due to limited space.
Lemma 2 shows that if an RTU must be responsible for
more IEDs, the delay to detect the attack will be increased
linearly. The reason is that the more IEDs per RTU, the less
accuracy for average-aggregation is. Therefore, the way to
improve the speed of detection under the average-aggregation
method when number of IEDs per RTU increases is to
increase the number of samples.
Lemma 3: Let bmin be the smallest number of bits that is
necessary to detect the attack for quantize-aggregation. The
asymptotic detection delay is equal to ADD∗. Furthermore,
any b-bit quantize aggregation where b > bmin, will have the
same asymptotic detection delay.
Proof: Omitted due to limited space.
bmin obviously depends on Dmin, µ0 and the number of
bits representing the data. For example, if 4 bits are used for
representation, Dmin = 4 and µ0 = 0, then bmin = 2.
Lemma 3 shows that once the Control Center can detect
the attack with current bit-allocation, allocating more bits
will not help to decrease the detection delay. This prop-
erty might suggest that quantize-aggregation will outperform
average-aggregation. However, if the number of IEDs per
RTU increases linearly, the number of bits to represent the
aggregated value is also linearly increased, which will take
more communication overhead. Therefore, if one takes into
account underlying communication, the quantize-aggregation
method will expose its weakness under certain conditions. We
will validate this claim in section VII.
VI. DELAY ANALYSIS OF VALUE ATTACK DETECTION
Since our goal is to detect mean-change attacks as soon as
possible, we need to understand factors contributing to the end-
to-end detection delay. In this section, we will decompose the
end-to-end detection delay into individual component delays
and show the relationship among them. Then, we will show the
bounds for those individual delays. This analysis will not only
help to understand factors affecting the end-to-end detection
delay but also make it possible to optimize system design for
a faster detection.
Figure 4 shows four main components contributing to end-
to-end detection delay.
1) LAN Delay: This delay is the time when an IED sends
the packet until corresponding RTU receives the packet.
It includes realtime scheduling, sending, propagation and
queueing delay. We denote this delay as D1
2) Collection Delay (Round Length): This delay is the time
that the RTU waits for all of its IEDs to send the packet
in that round. This delay is equal to the round length.
We call this delay as D2
3) WAN Delay: Similar to LAN delay factor, this delay
factor is the time between an RTU sending a packet and
the Control Center receiving the packet. This delay is
denoted as D3.
4) Detection Delay: This is the delay incurred by the mean-
change detection algorithm in section V performed at the
Control Center. We call this delay as D4. As mentioned
in section V, the unit of this component delay is the
number of samples reported by IEDs.
Briefly, the key ideas of this delay analysis is 1) finding
out how many samples that the Control Center needs from the
attacked IED to detect the attack (D4) and 2) calculating how
long it takes for each sample to transmit from an IED to the
Control Center (D1 +D2 +D3).
In subsequent sections, we will show the bound of these
delay factors.
A. LAN Delay - D1
As we assume that IEDs generate data aperiodically, the re-
altime scheme at LAN will execute aperiodic tasks. Although
the realtime guarantee for aperiodic tasks has been considered
[13] [14], what we really want is a bound for realtime
communication delay in LAN. Fortunately, this problem can
be derived from the work in [14]. The result in [14] can be
summarized as follows. (Note that in this section the terms
“tasks”, “messages” and “packets” are used interchangeably).
Let us now focus on a LAN that has ne IEDS. Also, let
Ci
3 be the time to transmit a message generated by ith IED
and Di be the relative deadline (e.g. 4ms after generated) of
the message.
At any given time t, let M(t) be the number of messages
that have generated but whose deadlines are not expired yet.
Abdelzaher et al. [14] define U(t), the synthetic utilization, as
follows
U(t) =
∑
Ti∈M(t)
Ci/Di (2)
They proved that using an optimal time-independent
scheduling policy, all messages will meet their deadlines if
∀t: U(t) ≤ UB(ne), where
UB(ne) =
1
2
+
1
2ne
, ne < 3
3Ci includes service time, propagation delay and queueing delay of the
message
and
UB(ne) =
1
1 +
√
1
2 (1− 1ne−1 )
, n ≥ 3 (3)
Because all IEDs are identical, Ci = C and Di = D ∀i =
1..n. Thus, (2) in our system will be
U(t) = ne
C
D
(4)
Substitute (4) to (3), we get
D ≥ 2n
2
eC
ne + 1
and
D ≥ ne(1 +
√
1
2
(1− 1
ne − 1))C, ne ≥ 3 (5)
(5) shows that even in the best case where the best time-
independent scheduling is used, the smallest guaranteed delay
for a message to transmit from an IED to corresponding RTU
is the right-side of (5). Therefore,
D1 = ne(1 +
√
1
2
(1− 1
ne − 1))C
B. Collection Time (Round length) - D2
As mentioned above, the aggregation at an RTU requires
that data from all of its IEDs has to be ready at the time of
aggregating. The time between two consecutive sending of an
RTU to the Control Center is called a round. Now, we are
interested in calculating the average round length.
Let us consider an RTU r and its IEDs 1...ner where
ner is the number of IEDs of RTU r. Let Xi(t) be the
Poisson process generating values of ith IED. According to the
property of Poisson process, the time between two consecutive
values generated by an IED is an exponential random variable.
Let Y (t) be the random process of round length.
At the time t0 of beginning of a new round, IEDs will
generate a new value following an exponential distribution.
Because RTU r must wait for values from all of its IEDs and
because of the memoryless property of the exponential random
variable, we have
Y (t) = max (X1(t), X2(t), ...Xner (t))
Thus,
E[Y (t)] = E[max (X1(t), .., Xner (t))]
Due to limited space, we omit the proof and show the final
result.
E[Y ] = E[
∫ ∞
0
nere
−λx(1− e−λx)ner−1xdx] (6)
Given the number of IEDs per RTU n and data-generating
rate λ, (6) shows how to calculate the average round length
E[Y ]. Thus, we have D2 = E[Y ].
C. WAN Delay - D3
The analysis of WAN delay is exactly the same of LAN
delay. The only difference for WAN delay is the network
parameters and realtime requirements, which are not relevant
for this analysis. Therefore, we will not discuss it further.
D. Mean-Change Detection Delay - D4
As shown in Lemma 1, the asymptotic average detection
delay of the non-parametric CUSUM algorithm for mean-
change detection is
D4 = ADDτ (T ) =
h
(1− )µ1 − µ0 , h→∞. (7)
Note that the unit of this delay is the number of samples.
E. Formula for End-To-End Detection Delay
When a mean-change takes place at an IED, it will take D4
number of samples to detect the change. Each sample takes
(D1 + D2 + D3) time unit (e.g. seconds) to be transmitted
from the IED to the Control Center. Therefore, the formula
for end-to-end detection delay is:
E2DDD = D4(D1 +D2 +D3) (8)
VII. VALIDATION
In this section, we validate our scheme in ns-2 simulator
with analysis results obtaining from Matlab.
A. Experimental Setup
1) Setup: We have implemented our scheme in the ns-2
(version 2.29)[15]. We place fixed number of 50 IEDs and
vary the number of RTUs from 1 to 50. For each number of
RTUs in the system, we distribute evenly number of IEDs to
RTUs. For example, if the number of RTUs is 10, then each
RTU will be responsible for 50/10 = 5 IEDs. Intuitively, the
more we have RTUs in the system, the smaller number of
IEDs that each RTU must handle.
We use the voltage measurements as the status values we
simulate. The normal value of the voltage measurement that
the system expects under normal condition is 120V . The
percentage of the variance of the measurement introduced by
noise is 2%(≈ 2V ). Please note that these measurement values
are just for simulation, not the fixed values. We provide a
summary of the parameters of our experimental setup in Table
I.
2) Attacks: For each run of the simulation, at random time
we uniformly pick an IED to change its mean value between
the range specified in Table I.
B. Scenarios
We want to see how our scheme performs under different
network scenarios. Specifically, we validate the mean-change
detection process under low-bandwidth networks and high-
bandwidth networks scenarios. Table II shows the parameters
for the low-bandwidth and the high-bandwidth network sce-
narios.
C. Metrics
The first metric that we use for validation of the anomaly
detection process is the average end-to-end detection delay of
the attack (in seconds), which the system wants to minimize.
As we vary the number of RTUs we want to measure how the
system performance is affected.
The second metric is the number of exchanged messages
between RTUs and the Control Center. This metric will
measure the effect of data aggregation on the overhead, in
terms of computation, at the RTUs and the Control Center. 4
D. Results
Figure 5(a) shows the results for the low-bandwidth sce-
nario. The x-axis shows the increasing number of RTUs in
the system. The y-axis shows the average end-to-end detection
delay (in seconds). The graph shows that the analysis and
simulation results closely match with each other. It also shows
that the quantize-aggregation performs better than average-
aggregation under low-bandwidth networks. This result makes
the claim in Lemma 3 clearer: under low-bandwidth net-
works when the communication cost is expensive and because
the average-aggregation must need more samples than that
of quantize-aggregation to detect the attack, the quantize-
aggregation will outperform average-aggregation.
Figure 5(b) shows the results for high-bandwidth scenario.
As we can see in the graph the quantize-aggregation exposes
its weakness under high-bandwidth networks. The reason
is that when the time to transmit an aggregated sample
of average-aggregation is much less than that of quantize-
aggregation, average-aggregation can transmit much more
samples and thus has better end-to-end detection delay.
We can see that the end-to-end detection delay without data
aggregation, which is represented by the thick line in Figure
5(a) and Figure 5(b), is larger than that of average-aggregation
and quantize-aggregation (especially in Figure 5(b)) when
the system has enough number of RTUs. This observation
confirms that data aggregation helps to improve the speed of
mean-change attack detection delay.
Figure 6 shows the messages exchanged between RTUs and
the Control Center. We can see in the figure that average-
aggregation and quantize-aggregation also help to reduce the
number of processing messages at RTUs and the Control
Center while still be able to detect the mean-change attacks.
E. Discussion of Results
The results show that data aggregation provides a chance for
faster end-to-end detection delay. However, neither average-
aggregation nor quantize-aggregation outperforms the other in
all scenarios. Depending on the communication cost i.e. low-
bandwidth networks or high-bandwidth networks, the scale of
the system i.e. number of IEDs and RTUs, we can choose the
suitable data aggregation scheme for faster detection.
4We do not measure the number of exchanged messages between IEDs and
RTUs because the data aggregation has no effect on it.
Parameter Value Description
FAR 10−6 Acceptable false alarm rate of CUSUM algorithm
#IEDs 50 Number of IEDs in the system
#RTUs [1,50] Number of RTUs vary from 1..50
IED Packet Size 1Kb The size of an IED packet
RTU Packet Size 1Kb The size of an RTU packet
Normal Value 120V The mean of IEDs’ value in normal condition
Mean-change range [200V, 300V] The range of the mean-change attack
Attack time 50th seconds The time the attack starts at
Simulation duration 5000s The time simulation stops
λ 0.4s Data-Generating rate of IEDs
Variance of Noise 2% (≈ 2V) The percentage of variance of IED measurement introduced by noise
TABLE I
PARAMETERS FOR EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Scenario Network from IEDs to RTUs Network from RTUs to the Control center
Low-bandwidth network 100Kbps 100Kbps
High-bandwidth network 100Mbps 100Mbps
TABLE II
PARAMETERS FOR LOW-BANDWIDTH AND HIGH-BANDWIDTH NETWORK SCENARIOS
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Fig. 5. Average end-to-end detection delay
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have looked at the use of data aggregation for detecting
mean-change attack in the PowerGrid. We have derived the re-
lationship and the importance among delay factors contributing
to the end-to-end detection delay. Our analysis has shown that
end-to-end detection delay should not only involve with the
semantic of the data but also should involve with underlying
communication networks.
Then, we explore two aggregation schemes: average-
aggregation and quantize-aggregation and apply non-
parametric CUSUM method for quickest mean-change
detection. We have shown that it is possible to reduce
end-to-end detection delay by data aggregation. Finally, the
analysis and simulation results show that neither average-
aggregation nor quantize-aggregation outperforms the other
in all scenarios. We suggest that depending on the system
parameters such as network bandwidth, we could choose an
appropriate aggregation method for faster detection.
IX. APPENDIX
Table III shows the notations used in this paper.
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